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Book Reviews
Michael D. Gibson, Book Review Editor
Combined Operations in the Civil War, by Rowena Reed. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1978. pp. xxiii, 468. Photographs, maps,
bibliography, index. $16.95.
Combined operations at the beginning of the Civil War, operations
where army and navy forces had to work together to attain an objec-
tive, were characterized by ineptness and confusion. This occurred
despite General McClellan's strategy, a strategy dependent on the
successful coordination of the two arms.
Rowena Reed's Combined Operations traces the ups and downs of
the Civil War with emphasis upon theaters where cooperation
between naval and army commanders was vital to the success of cam-
paigns. Reed rightly places most emphasis upon Union campaigns to
open the Mississippi and attacks against coastal fortifications. The
book is divided into three parts. Two sections analyze the evolution of
combined operations on the strategic level and the collapse of that
strategy. The final part covers the development of combined tactics
near the end of the war. Reed does, perhaps, ascribe too much to
McClellan's removal as general-in-chief as the prime cause of the
failure of a combined-operations strategy. Reed states such a strategy
could have won the war in the first two years if it had been success-
fully pursued. But among the reasons for such failure should also be
included the lack of sufficient riverine forces and the loss of able gen-
erals to the Confederate side.
The book's sharp photographs and ample maps provide the neces-
sary background for an understanding of the technology and geogra-
phy involved in the phases of the war Reed analyzes. To take but one
example, the maps which accompany the chapters on the operations
against Fort Fisher near Wilmington clarify the text and make very
evident how a successful combined attack finally took the fort. Reed
details throughout the work how lessons learned in earlier operations
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ultimately led to successful combined operations, and states that these
lessons were not lost upon later military planners.
Civil War enthusiasts and military historians should find a great deal
to interest them in Reed's book. Accounts of operations in the Missis-
sippi Valley, including those which failed to open the river, will be of
interest to Mississippi Valley historians. Reed makes the cogent argu-
ment that Vicksburg fell not by brilliant planning, but as a result of
the situation in which the combatants found themselves. This leads
her to suggest that what happens in war often comes out of the pres-
sure of circumstances and only appears in retrospect to have been
planned.
This eminently readable book provides an adequate portrayal of the
politics and personalities involved and demonstrates how combined
operations were affected by other theaters of the war. Although it
skips over the tragedy of civil war, and frequently omits the casualty
figures, the work has a place in any basic collection of Civil War
books.
Ed Cass
" Army Corps of Engineers
Omaha, NE
The Orphan Brigade: The Kentucky Confederates Who Couldn't Go
Home, by William C. Davis. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, 1980. pp. xv, 318. Illustrations, notes, source note,
bibliography, index. $12.95.
The First Kentucky Brigade was one of the most famous units in the
Confederate army. Composed largely of Kentuckians who fought
tenaciously but were impatient with discipline, the "Orphans"
haunted the southern imagination. The unit's association with such
noted leaders as John C. Breckinridge, Simon Bolivar Buckner, and
John Hunt Morgan added lustre to its reputation.
Organized at Bowling Green in the autumn of 1861, the brigade and
its auxiliaries numbered 3,680 men. Three years later the number was
well under one thousand, despite the presence of such soldiers as John
Mahon who was wounded five times but always recovered in time for
the next battle. Some Tennessee and Alabama troops were a part of
the brigade until November 1863, when it became an all Kentucky
unit. Its history was confused for several months in 1862 when it was
divided and each part claimed to be the First Kentucky Brigade.
649

